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Introduction
I tend to think of myself as bodily. Probably, so do you. 
Philosophically this takes some explaining. 
A candidate explanation is this: The bodily self is a physical agent. Knowledge of oneself as bodily is fundamentally knowledge of oneself as agentive; such knowledge is grounded in both experience of oneself as instantiating a bodily structure that affords a limited range of actions; and experience of oneself as a physical agent that tries to perform a limited range of actions over time. 
By contrast René Descartes famously argued that all self-knowledge is grounded in, and cannot extend beyond, knowledge of oneself as a mental entity. If correct this would preclude the possibility of any knowledge of a bodily self, for such a thing would ex hypothesi not exist. 
Accordingly, this dissertation serves a dual purpose: to demonstrate why a Cartesian theory of self-knowledge is no threat to an account of bodily self knowledge; and to provide such an account. 





There are at least two senses of the term ‘self-knowledge’. One sense is the knowledge I have of my occurrent states. Call this ‘occurrent self-knowledge’. Another is the knowledge that I am a persisting subject with a particular nature, with certain qualities and capacities. Call this ‘substantive self-knowledge’. These will be returning themes throughout the dissertation, though I will say more on the former than the latter. This former sense, occurrent self-knowledge, requires a minimal capacity to pick out states which may be ascribed to the self and no other, and thus the capacity to distinguish self from non-self. Call this the capacity for ‘self-identification’. 
This capacity will play a central role in this chapter. I will demonstrate that there is certain category of judgments that are guaranteed to refer to the self, and secondly that the very existence of such a category does not wholly determine what kind of state – i.e. a state of the body or a state of the mind – can legitimately be ascribed to the self. In achieving this clarification I will first give an account of the underlying model of reference employed in judgments that guarantee self-reference. In the second section I will exposit an argument for occurrent bodily self-knowledge on the basis of guaranteed reference. In the third section I will articulate a Cartesian response to this argument. Finally I will discuss the implications of this response and give a brief statement of the structure of the remaining thesis.

1.1. Two senses of ‘I’ and immunity to error 
Let us begin with a brief but illustrative story. Say I am walking home through a dangerous area on a dark night. As a round a corner into an alleyway I am struck hard in the face by a man with ill intentions towards me. Before I pass out I judge that…
“I am in pain”
Later, once I have regained consciousness, I am shown a photograph of a fellow who looks rather like me, sprawled out in the alleyway familiar from earlier on, sporting a black-eye. Upon seeing the photograph I judge that…
	“I have a black-eye”
The two uses of the word ‘I’ seem to employ two different senses:
(i)	‘I’ as subject
	I am in pain
(ii)	‘I’ as object
	I have a black eye
Now, if I am to refer myself, I must ‘know which’ object I actually refer to. I must be able distinguish it from other possible objects of reference, in a way that enables my judgement to be determined as true or false. When I refer to myself, ‘I’, as an object (as in category (ii)) I might fail to distinguish myself from other objects. I might pick out the wrong object as myself. It is possible that the object I refer to when I see the photograph is not myself at all, it might be my twin brother (who is always following me around and was accosted by the same reprobate); or a rather lifelike dummy made up so as to fool me. These may seem extreme, but we could take a less extreme instance. Whilst inspecting a printout I have been given, having just undergone an x-ray, I may believe 
“I have a broken nose”
…yet it is possible that I am observing another person’s printout, detailing their broken nose, which I believe to be mine. 
In cases such as these there is certainly room for one to ask 
“Are you sure that it is you who is that way?”
For even if one has considerable warrant for believing that a particular predicate is being instantiated, one can still be in error about who is instantiating that predicate (Wittgenstein 1958, p67.). Error of this form has been dubbed, by Shoemaker (1968) in particular, ‘error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun’. Such error is possible if and only if a speaker knows some object to be a certain way, but may be mistaken, for the exclusive reason that he (or she) believes that object to be himself (or herself).
By contrast, this kind of error seems impossible when I refer to myself as a subject; the ‘know which’ requirement seems to be fulfilled by default. For example, if (for some reason) I sincerely uttered the statement 
“I am in pain” 
…it would be absurd for someone to ask me
“Are you sure that you are in pain?” 
One can ask of course, but the absurdity lies in the expectation of any possible negative answer. For when I refer to myself as the subject of the pain experience there is only one possible object I could be referring to. Or rather, to put it another way, when I refer to myself as a subject my reference is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun. 
So it seems the dichotomy between categories (i) and (ii) draws the same line as the dichotomy between statements that are ‘immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun’ and those that are not. Instances of category (i) – where ‘I’ is used ‘as subject’ – are immune to this particular error, whereas instances of category (ii) – where ‘I’ is used ‘as object’ – are not. In respect of this we can call category (i) the category of immune self-reference:
Category of immune self-reference	
	Only statements in the ‘I as subject’ category are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun ‘I’
This is a category of guaranteed self-identifying judgements. By being immune to errors of misidentification relative to the first person, these judgements always refer to the self. 

1.1.1. The failures of descriptive reference
This guarantee of self-reference is not gained by some sort of description. Descriptive identification will always be inadequate to guarantee reference to the self.​[1]​ In fact a descriptive model of reference is exactly what explains the examples of reference failure we have given above. Take the x-ray example. I see an x-ray printout – call this ‘a’ – and I believe it to be of a skeleton instantiating the property of a broken nose – call this property ‘φ’ – and I believe it to be my skeleton instantiating that property. In this case the judgement
“I am φ” 
…is based upon an identification of ‘a’ as ‘b’, and ‘b’ as me. Let us call this a ‘process of identification’. In this process there are really three judgements
“a is φ” &  “b is φ” & “I am ‘b’”
In order to yield the conclusion that “I am φ”, these must rest upon two identity propositions
‘a = b’ & ‘b = Me’
As we said earlier, the last of these especially is open to error. 
This possibility of error cannot be removed by yet another descriptive identification. Say perhaps I identify the broken nose bone I see in the x-ray, with the misshapen nose I see in the mirror (‘c’). In which case the judgement 
“I am φ” 
…requires the further judgement 
 “c is φ”
…and the identity propositions
 ‘b=c’ & ‘c=Me’
Again this further identification is open to error, for the same fundamental reason that all others would be: I might well have been looking at another person’s printout in the first place. 
We cannot resolve the possibility of reference failure by a recursive process of identification, as each identification may be inadequate (it may have latched onto the wrong object or none at all) and thus require a further identification, which itself might require a further identification… and so on ad infinitum.​[2]​ But perhaps this is all that the above tells us, that the process of identification cannot be recursive. For one could assume that, in descriptive singular reference, the subject’s knowledge of which object is in question is ultimately determined by a definite description, such as 
‘The X’
…uniquely satisfied by ‘a’. 
Thus every judgement of the form 
“a is φ” 
…would rest upon only the pair of judgements 
‘a = The X’ & ‘The X is φ’. 
This might well be the correct model for certain aspects of singular reference. But the rot sets in when this descriptive model is applied to self-reference. For with any descriptive concept ‘X’, uniquely satisfied by me, it is still possible that I realise that 
‘X is φ’ 
…without realising that 
‘I am X’ 
…and therefore that 
‘I am φ’.
 In fact, as many have noted, this model allows for cases in which “‘speaking of’ or ‘referring to’ oneself is compatible with not knowing that the object one speaks of is oneself” (Anscombe 1975, p2).​[3]​ For instance, I may be standing in line at my local shop and idly looking at a closed circuit television screen presenting a current image of the shop floor. In doing so I may notice that the bald man (‘the X’) is getting his pocket picked (‘is φ’), but yet not realise it is my pocket being picked (‘I am φ’) as I had forgotten that I had just had my hair cut.​[4]​
In sum, descriptive reference cannot be the model of reference employed in self-identifying judgements. The basic problem is that reference in these cases depends upon a process of identification. Regardless of whether that process is recursive or not, the reference is indirect as a result. Any indirect reference is party to an epistemic gap between referrer and referred, which is compatible with a subject not knowing which object they refer to. In self-reference this means that, as a subject must identify the object that it refers to as itself, it is possible that it might misidentify that object as itself. It is unlikely that this is how bona fide self-reference works; it certainly cannot be how guaranteed self-reference works.

1.1.2. The virtues of identification-free reference
Identification-free reference does not suffer the ailments of descriptive reference – making it rather more attractive as a model of self-reference (Evans 1982). For rather than discriminating its object by description, it discriminates its object by demonstrative. Instead of ascribing the predicate ‘φ’ as part of a mediate description of the object in question, discrimination by demonstrative is direct, in that it does not involve anything like the ‘process of identification’ described above. This is really why Evans calls it ‘identification-free’: It is ‘identification-free’ in the sense that the subject does not come to know that a predicate is being instantiated and only then indirectly identify an object by means of some description involving that predicate. Rather the very means by which the subject comes to know that a predicate is instantiated is exactly the means by which the subject comes to know directly which object instantiates that predicate.
This directness, characteristic of identification-free reference, is achieved by a particular relationship between referrer and referred: an informational link. This relationship is best specified functionally, in terms of informational input and behavioural output. On the input side, an information-channel between subject and object directly determines the truth or falsity of the subject’s thought concerning the object – such as whether or not the object instantiates a particular predicate (Evans 1982, p146 & pp222-223). This does not leave open the question of which object the information refers to. For the information-channel is direct if and only if, on the output side, the subject’s actions concerning that object are disposed to be sensitive to the information received through that channel (ibid. pp206-207). These are the two elements of the functional profile specifying an informational-link: direct informational input and correspondingly sensitive behavioural output. So an informational-link is present when:
a)	the relevant information channel is direct
&
b)	the subject is disposed to act in accordance with the information received
Whenever an informational link is present between referrer and referred, reference is identification-free. Furthermore, when reference is made in this way there is no room for any errors of misidentification, precisely because the informational link provides information that identifies a particular object by default: the object towards which I am disposed to act.

1.2. Referring to the body as the self
We might return to the shop example above to fill out these considerations with regard to self-reference: I am unaware that it is I who is being pick-pocketed, when I merely observe that the bald man is having his pocket picked; I do not know that I instantiate the predicate ‘being pick-pocketed’. I am blissfully unaware, until perhaps 
I feel tactual sensations at the top of my leg 
…then it becomes immediately obvious that ‘I’ am instantiating the predicate, and I reach for my wallet. This ‘self-realisation’, so to speak, comes about precisely because the information channel is direct and unmediated by any general description. When I receive information in this way, I am accordingly disposed to act in a certain way i.e. reach for my wallet. 
Moreover, one might argue that in the very statement
‘I feel tactual sensations at the top of my leg’ 
…we have a simple case of occurrent self-knowledge of one’s bodily states. In the above I self-ascribe a physical predicate: the spatial location of a sensation on a part of myself as a spatially extended object i.e. a human body. As the very means by which I know that the predicate
‘…feel tactual sensations at the top of my leg’
…is being instantiated, is the very means by which I know that I instantiate the predicate. This judgement is identification-free and thus immune to errors of identification; it would make no sense to ask who was feeling the sensations. 
Gareth Evans (1982) makes a similar point. For he believes that to ask a question such as
	‘Are you sure that it is you whose legs are crossed?’
…after the statement
	‘My legs are crossed’
…makes no sense if one were to expect a negative answer, where the statement is made on the basis of bodily experience. This is part of what he believes to be our “most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self” (ibid p220).​[5]​ Moving further along these lines, one might argue that in these cases of bodily experience the subject being referred to is a physical subject i.e. a bodily self, drawing on material from this and the last section:
An Evansian argument for bodily self-knowledge
1.	Immunity to error through misidentification is required for legitimate self-ascription
2.	Immunity to error through misidentification is a product of identification-free reference.
3.	Self-ascription of physical properties on the basis of bodily experience is an instance of identification-free reference
4.	We may legitimately ascribe physical properties to the self
5.	The self to which we ascribe physical properties is a bodily self
6.	Bodily experience constitutes occurrent knowledge of the bodily self
There are two things wrong with this argument. 
Firstly it makes the mistake of equivocating between statements that are ‘immune to error through misidentification’ and statements that are ‘immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronouns’. Both kinds of statement are identification-free and are thus guaranteed to refer to a particular object. But guaranteed reference is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition, for inclusion in the category of immune self-reference. Guaranteed reference does not entail self-identification. In order to claim that such and such an identification-free statement ascribes certain properties to my self, one requires further reasons beyond the fact that the statement is identification-free. 
Secondly, the above does not provide an account of bodily experience that vitiates its claims. For it does not yet rule out a Cartesian account of bodily experience which holds that the experience is essentially mental, predicated of a Cartesian ego which fundamentally non-bodily.
In fact both errors amount to begging the question against the Cartesian. As such both will become clearer with a brief exposition of the Cartesian position.

1.3. A Cartesian response
The Cartesian holds that the self is mysteriously attached but in an important sense detached from its physical body. This falls out of basic epistemological commitments. On the Cartesian view all knowledge must begin with the mental. More specifically: knowledge of the physical world requires prior knowledge of a mental self – an ego – undergoing a variety of conscious experiences; so all knowledge is founded on occurrent self-knowledge of a mental self. This epistemological system is aptly characterised as ‘foundationalist’. There are two classes of beliefs in a foundationalist system (Chisholm 1982). One class consists of beliefs that are self-justifying; another class consists of beliefs which gain justification by recursive inferential links to the self-justified class. 
Beliefs in the self-justified class are self-justified because they are infallible. Descartes proposed that whatever one clearly and distinctly perceived in one’s own mind was infallible: if one clearly and distinctly perceives p, then p is true. Clear and distinct perceptions comprise his self-justified class. These are easiest defined negatively. Anything extrinsic to the mind cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived (Descartes 1641, 2nd & 6th Meditations). A paradigm case is a pain. Only the pain experience, rather than for instance its perceived location, is clearly and distinctly perceived. Significantly, this means that all experience must strip down to intrinsically mental, qualitative features, which are epistemologically authoritative in virtue of being infallible (Descartes 1644, Part I, §§2 & 68).
This gives a thoroughly different orientation​[6]​ on statements like
‘I feel tactual sensations at the top of my leg’
The Cartesian will contend that such statements should really be broken down to 
(a) ‘I seem to feel tactual sensations’ – an ‘ego statement’
&
(b) ‘The top of my leg is being stimulated’ – a ‘body statement’. 
Mutatis mutandis for other forms of bodily experience; the Cartesian holds that the statement
	‘My legs are crossed’
…should really broken down to
	(a) ‘I seem to be aware of legs being crossed’ – an ‘ego statement’
&
	(b) ‘My legs are crossed’ – a ‘body statement’
For the Cartesian, the content of the ‘ego statement’ is in fact the true nature of the experience. This ‘seeming’, predicated of an ego, is reliably correlated with states of the body contingently ‘attached’ to the self and (only inferentially) provides justification for beliefs about states of the body. ‘Ego statements’ are strictly speaking the only correct instantiation of self-reference. They are logically distinct from and epistemologically prior to ‘body statements’, which do not refer to a first personal subject. ‘Body statements’ refer to something that is his, not him. In short the ‘I’ in (a) and the ‘my’ in (b) are not equivalent.
One could attempt to rescue the Evansian argument of the last section by holding that a Cartesian dualistic decomposition must employ a descriptive model of reference to the body, where ‘that body’ or ‘the body from which I hereby have information’ is ‘the X’ (§1.1.1). If this were the case then the Cartesian would have a problem in explaining why statements involving self-ascription of physical properties are immune to error through misidentification (Evans 1982). However, as Brewer (1995) notes, the Cartesian view is compatible with a perceptual demonstrative – and thus identification-free – model of reference, where ‘my body’ is to be understood as ‘this body’, with the caveat that reference to a material body is never self-reference. If we frame the Cartesian position in this way, reference to the body is on a par with a demonstrative reference to any perceptually specified object; it just so happens that the subject is causally attached to this particular object in such a way that he comes to refer to it as his (Brewer 1995, p295-297). On this picture, immunity to error through misidentification is a natural consequence of reference to bodily states as states of one’s own body.
The above is sufficient to yield a response to the argument of the last section. This can be summarised as follows
A Cartesian response
1.	Bodily experience is intrinsically mental.
2.	Statements that self-ascribe physical properties decompose to 
(a)	 An ‘ego statement’
& 
(b)	 A ‘body statement’. 
3.	Ego statements are logically distinct from, and epistemologically prior to, body statements:
o	Ego statements refer to a first personal subject; 
o	Body statements refer to something that is his, not him. 
4.	The subject of bodily experience is a mental self

1.4. The structure of the remaining thesis
The Cartesian position presents two clear challenges for the bodily self theorist, not on the grounds of metaphysics, but on the grounds of phenomenology and epistemology.
The first challenge is to give an account of bodily experience that rules out the Cartesian account. 
The second challenge is to provide reasons for holding that reference to the body is reference to the self, and this amounts to finding justificatory grounds for bodily self-knowledge. 
Though I will not defend the Evansian argument outright, I will be attempting to address both these issues. Chapter 2 will address the first issue, by first examining an internal problem with the Cartesian account and then providing a detailed argument in support of one alternative explanation of bodily experience. Materials from this chapter will then be integrated with a programmatic discussion of bodily self-knowledge and its fundamental relationship with agency in Chapter 3. This final chapter will be more expository than argumentative, but will hopefully provide an adequate sketch of the relationship between self-identification, occurrent bodily self-knowledge and substantive bodily self-knowledge. Finally I will conclude with some remarks on the deficiencies of the thesis and an overall summary.

Chapter 2
2.0. The content of bodily experience​[7]​
It seems that the Cartesian and Evans can admit at least one thing in common: that bodily sensations are discriminated by demonstratives. As Brewer (1995) notes, on the Cartesian view this really amounts to a ‘quasi-perceptual’ reference to an object that is merely the cause of a non-bodily experience. Now, the most conspicuous difference between things that are bodily in nature and things that are mental in nature is simply that the former instantiate spatial properties, whereas this not an obvious feature of the latter.​[8]​ Recall that for the Cartesian bodily experience is essentially non-bodily; if the mental is non-spatial then this view requires a reduction: it requires that we can intelligibly strip away all the spatiality from the bodily experiential content, down to an un-located qualitative ‘seeming’ (in the same way as might be done for all perception on the Cartesian view).
Take an itch on my right hand for example. As we said above (§1.3), in such a case the Cartesian wants to employ an identification-free model of reference. So it must be possible to fill out the relevant functional profile (§1.1.2) solely in terms of qualitative features of the experience characterised as 
‘I seem to be aware of an itch on my right hand’
This might be rather un-problematic on the input side. I infer an itchy-state of my body when I experience an itch. The inference to the itchy body state is sustained by the self-justifying belief that I seem to experience an itch. But if this is all that the input consists in, then considerable mystery abounds on the output side. For how are we to explain the fact that I am disposed to make a reaching action towards my right hand and scratch at a particular location, if the itch does not seem to be in a particular body part, at a particular location? 
The difficulty is this: It seems woefully inadequate to describe the ‘seeming’ spatiality of bodily experience as a mere qualitative feature of the experience. On such an account the spatial location of a bodily sensation or attended body part must be inferred from the something-it-is-like to have that particular experience, the particular quality of the experiential content. Yet the phenomenology of bodily experience presents bodily sensations as intrinsically (rather than inferentially) spatially located in body parts occupying spatial locations. The same holds for attending to body parts. When I attend to my arm raised above my head, intrinsic to my experience of my arm is its spatial location. And this experiential content is bound up with implications for bodily action, simply in virtue of its intrinsic spatiality.​[9]​
I am hard pressed to see how such phenomena can be explained by any qualitative delimitation that might putatively sustain inferences of the necessary kind. Indeed, Bill Brewer dispenses with the view decisively and is worth quoting here at length: 
“…there are no such things as back-of-the-right-hand-ish sharp pains as opposed to back-of-the-left-hand-ish sharp pains; the right/left distinction need not be matched by any qualitative distinction at all. Indeed the idea of distinctive qualia associated with every bodily location is absurd. For a qualitatively unchanging sensation can move, and change its location. For example, the very same burning feeling might be moving gradually down one’s throat. Similarly, qualitatively identical itches might come sometimes as on the end of one’s nose and at other time’s (infuriatingly out of reach) between one’s shoulder blades.” (298, his emphases)
Of course it is not the case that there are no qualitative differences between bodily sensations that are distinctive of particular body parts: the pain of a broken kneecap is certainly qualitatively distinct from a toothache; and it is unlikely that anyone will ever have a nauseous big toe. Nevertheless, it would clearly be a mistake to gerrymander a qualitative scheme from these (rather limited) cases in order to explain the prima facie link between bodily experience and bodily action. 
But now it just seems as if the Cartesian reduction is untenable. We cannot reduce the spatial content of bodily experience to a qualitative seeming. Actually there is one further (albeit unattractive) option for the Cartesian we will consider in §2.5. Presently though, if the objection is to stick, it is incumbent upon me to provide an account of bodily experience that explains the link to bodily action qua intrinsic spatiality. This will occupy us in §§2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. 

2.1. Two anti-Cartesian accounts of bodily experience
A fruitful point of departure is Bill Brewer’s (1995) treatment, levelled as a direct attack upon the Cartesian. Thus he argues that in non pathological bodily awareness:
“The spatial content of our “feeling-in-a-certain-body-part-at-a-position-in-body-relative-physical-space” is given indexically in terms of its implications for our direct action in connection with that location”
(Brewer 1995, 302)  
Take case R for instance: 
(R) 	A (non-pathological) subject reaches to the perceived location of a bodily sensation.
A minimal sketch of Brewer’s explanatory account might comprise the following two claims:
(i)	Bodily experience is intrinsically spatial, it presents the original location of the pain/itch etc. as within the egocentric space of the subject.
(ii)	The appropriate action for reaching a bodily location is determined by the content of our experience.
(Brewer 1995, pp297-303)
I think these are correct, but we must be careful in how we read them, as they can be unpacked in different ways. Indeed they are abstract enough to leave open questions such as: 
‘What is meant by egocentric space?’ 
‘In what way are actions upon the body determined by the content of our experience?’
The ambiguity is hardly surprising. For firstly the context in which the claims are made is not one in which a general account of bodily experience is intended. Rather, Brewer’s main concerns are with giving an account of bodily sensations that rules out the Cartesian view that the subject of bodily experience is not a spatially extended object. Secondly, much of the phenomenological analysis is illustrated with quotations drawn from Brian O’Shaughnessy’s (1980) text The Will. It is possible that Brewer would not wish to commit to certain implications of a view that may have been drawn upon for general illustration. But in order to make progress we need to distinguish between possible readings and assess their plausibility. 
I believe there to be at least two possible interpretations to be drawn from Brewer’s account. (There may be more, but these are of most interest as they are the most contrastive). Although each interpretation is a potential consequence of the two claims we noted above, each takes a thoroughly distinct stand on both the richness (fineness of grain) of the experiential content and the nature of the egocentric spatial framework that content is delivered in. These contrastive aspects are significant, simply because they entail divergent explanatory accounts of the relationship between bodily experience and bodily action. 
One potential way of explaining the capacity for direct and immediate action upon a bodily location is to say that it is indicative of a highly detailed and stable representation of the body; a representation that is suitable for the micro-managed guidance of actions (see for instance O’Shaughnessy 1980, Volume I, Ch. 7, for an account along these lines). On such a view any body directed action is kept in check by its adherence to the strict guidelines imposed by the spatial content of the experience. Spatial contents require corresponding spatial frameworks. And any spatial content that is suitable for guiding action requires a spatial framework that is suitable for guiding actions. The most viable candidate here is a ‘universal’ egocentric spatial framework – a framework not tied to particular body parts, and thus suitable for guiding and co-ordinating actions directed to any location in peripersonal space.​[10]​ This is a necessary implication of any view that holds that the content of bodily experience has just this kind of action-guiding spatial content. 
But a contrasting thesis need not affirm that the content of our bodily experience is suitable for guiding actions in this way.​[11]​ For it is also possible to assert the existence of such a universal framework, but only as part of a sub-personal motor processing scheme that micro-manages the action. Such a view would need to provide an alternative account of the framework in which the experiential spatial contents are delivered. One possibility open to any contrasting thesis is to assert that these spatial contents are delivered in a framework defined by structural relationships between particular body parts. But this says little about the implications that these relationships might have for bodily action. In this regard one could assert that these structural relationships are themselves defined by the possibilities that they afford for various types of action.
The key aspects of the two theses outlined in the previous two paragraphs can be summarised as follows:
(T1): The experiential content of bodily awareness is fine grained 
	It has a level of detail and stability particularly apt for guiding fluent action (upon the body)
	It is delivered in an egocentric spatial framework defined by universal body-centred co-ordinates (rather than co-ordinates centred upon particular body parts) 
 (T2): The experiential content of bodily awareness is coarse grained 
	It contains no stable representation of the exact location of a sensation or body part in egocentric space
	It is delivered in an egocentric spatial framework defined by the structural relationships between body parts and the possibilities they afford for various types of action upon the body. 
T1 is, I will argue, an unrealistic account of the link between bodily experience and bodily action. In the following I advocate the superiority of the alternative thesis, T2, by inference to the best explanation.
I take it that the central issue between the two theses is highlighted by the question: 
	When we notice the body is the content of our experience suitable for guiding actions? 
No decisive insights can be had here from mere introspection on the phenomenology of normal experience, at least none that will rule out either thesis outright. Rather, a decisive answer to this question requires consideration of abnormal cases, drawing out what one might call a ‘negative phenomenology’ to provide a solid theoretical basis for phenomenological insights.​[12]​ As such I will proceed by unpacking and evaluating the explanatory commitments of each thesis (relative to the above question) in both pathological and illusory cases. Beginning, in §2.3, with pathological cases of peripherally deafferented subjects, I outline prima facie considerations that seem to militate against T1. I then, in §2.4, present a model of bodily awareness compatible with T2 and unpack it with reference to empirical studies, where the manipulation of kinaesthetic information generates an illusory experience of arm position. Again T1 is found lacking. Finally, T1 is faced with a dilemma that casts further doubt on its explanatory adequacy. 
2.2. Pathological cases of bodily experience 
(& the Body Schema)
G.L and I.W. have lost most of their peripheral nervous system. Specifically, they have lost their large somatosensory receptors; their muscle spindles and golgi tendon organs. These physiological deficits seem to correlate with a radical reduction in their capacity for proprioception. Both have no afferent proprioceptive feedback from kinaesthetic sensors and very little tactual perception (though they still register deep pain or vibration). As such they are largely unaware of anything more than the structural layout of their body parts, and there seem to be correlated behavioural deficits. Although their motor fibres are largely undamaged, for these ‘peripherally deafferented subjects’ a reach to a bodily location on the basis of a somatosensory stimulus is something like an empirical discovery achieved on the basis of an abstracted description. Rather than being direct, immediate and usually veridical, their body directed actions seem to operate by a hypothetical investigation of possible locations amongst rough structural parameters (Brewer 1995, Cole 1995, Cole & Paillard 1995, Gallagher 2005).​[13]​
What might this tell us about the content of normal bodily awareness? Well, a proponent of T1 might argue that what they lack (and what we in turn possess) is a particularly fine-grained spatial content to our bodily experience: a content that carries with it all the information required for action upon the perceived bodily location. So, if this is right, we would have grounds for thinking that the phenomenology of normal bodily experience is such that a non-pathological subject is directly aware of the exact site of stimulation. It is this that explains her capacity for direct and immediate action according to T1.
Actually this view manifests a clear error if we examine the behavioural deficits of G.L and I.W more closely:
	Both experienced initial difficulty in controlling all basic actions – even speaking and chewing – post neuropathy onset (Cole & Paillard 1995, pp248-249). 
	Both are unable to maintain posture or perform actions in the dark as they rely heavily upon visual cues from the exocentric frame. (Blouin et al. 1993 (cited in Cole & Paillard 1995))
Certainly this suggests an impaired ‘universal’ egocentric processing framework. By which I mean a framework defined by primitive functions that allow the transformation of spatial co-ordinates centred upon particular body parts to a set of universal ‘body-centred’ co-ordinates (Pouget & Sejnowski 1997). Without this the subjects must rely on self-specifying environmental cues, through vigilant conscious attention to the spatial relations of visual landmarks and structures (Cole and Paillard pp252-253). This is not the case with normal subjects. As a normally afferented individual I need not consciously rely heavily on vision to perform movements, for I can usually rely on my body to assert itself in accordance with whatever I am trying to do. Unfortunately the case is different for G.L and I.W: 
	Even well after the initial impairment both must constantly consciously observe themselves and the environment in order to achieve basic actions. 
o	I.W, for instance, must conceptualise all posture and action, and can only achieve goals by consciously attending to body parts and/or invariant features of the local environment (Gallagher & Cole 1995, Cole 1995).
Thus it seems that in the pathological cases, conscious attention is functionally replacing whatever mechanism it is that usually enables fluent action. In 1920 Head proposed a viable candidate for such a mechanism; a system of dynamic processes governing posture and movement, where universal egocentric information – concerning body position in relation to peripersonal space, derived from a variety of sensory cues – is updated constantly and processed holistically, enabling the nervous system to both initiate a complex of appropriate operations and inhibit inappropriate operations (Head H. 1920, Holmes N.P  & Spence C. 2004, Maravita. & Iriki 2004.). This system has been characterised (more succinctly) by one recent commentator as “a system of sensori-motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring” (Gallagher 2005, p.24), and is generally known as the Body Schema (BS). 
Both G.L & I.W have clearly lost the capacity to employ most of the motor schemas that initiate many basic reflexive operations. Contrast this with cases of ‘blind-touch’. A centrally deafferented stroke patient, R.S., has been reported as being able to reach directly to the location of a bodily stimulus without any reflective awareness of the stimulus itself. So it seems that we have a ‘double dissociation’ between peripherally deafferented subjects – who can perceive but cannot directly locate a bodily stimulus – and centrally deafferented subjects – who cannot perceive but can directly locate a body stimulus (Paillard 2005).​[14]​ By abduction, the likely cause of G.L and I.W’s behavioural deficits is the loss of peripheral sensors that would deliver much of the afferent information required in maintaining a BS.​[15]​
If this is right then the error manifest in T1 is clear. For surely it is the loss of this key sub-personal mechanism, namely the BS, which explains G.L’s and I.W’s incapacity for direct and immediate action. Yes the content of their experience is different, by necessity it cannot include certain things: they cannot (without looking) tell whether or not their legs are crossed for instance. But this does not warrant the inference that normal bodily experience includes the kind of fine-grained spatial content required to reach a bodily target. Perhaps it seems that way because of the normal success and fluency of actions, underlain by a properly functioning BS. Although such reliability is significant (see §§3.3., 3.4.) the claim of phenomenological contact with the exact site of stimulation commits a kind of category mistake, confusing the properties of a sub-personal mechanism with a personal level experience. Seemingly a large part of this mistake is in attributing the universal egocentric framework employed by the BS to the mode of information processing that enables conscious experience.
But maybe this is a bit quick. For as soon as one admits that the pathological cases reveal that the BS is non-conscious, one rules out T1 by definition. To further persuade the reader I will motivate T2 with a model of bodily awareness that vitiates its claims and rules out T1 in other concrete cases.

2.3. Illusory bodily experience & a dynamic model
One imperfection of our example...
(R) 	A (non-pathological) subject reaches to the perceived location of a bodily sensation.
…is that it might misleadingly restrict bodily experience to bodily sensations barging into perceptual consciousness. Of course this does occur (e.g. when one experiences an itch) but this neither captures the full range of bodily experience nor how it operates, for one can direct one’s attention to one’s body parts at will. In fact attention to the body is the aspect of bodily experience we are centrally concerned with in this discussion. A rich and relevant account of this is Kinsbourne’s (1995) dynamic model:
	Bodily experience is an emergent product of somatic attention​[16]​
o	Somatosensory input is received from very same (somatic) proprioceptive sensors that partially inform the BS, but processed for the purpose of producing potentially conscious representations of the body.​[17]​ 
	Selective attention to individual body parts determines their spatial orientation independently and relates them to each other post hoc on structural principles.
	Conscious representations of the body are dynamic and fast decaying, requiring constant re-updating by selective attention
It is easiest to illustrate the model in application to cases in which bodily experience has been manipulated. In an intriguing paradigm Lackner used an electro-magnetic physiotherapy vibrator to induce illusory stretching of the biceps or triceps (Lackner 1988, Lackner & Dizio 1984 (also cited in Kinsbourne 1995), Lackner & Dizio 1992). In one study this not only made subjects believe that their limb had moved, but also caused them to believe that the body part in contact with the limb (e.g. nose, top of head, waist) had stretched or depressed (Lackner & DiZio 1984). For example, when subjects stood with a finger upon their head, triceps vibration induced the perceptual belief that their finger had entered their cranium or that their head had been forced into their trunk. Under the present understanding this can be parsimoniously explained as a manipulation of somatosensory information influencing the content of an unstable conscious representation of the body. The illusion is generated because the orientation of individual body parts is determined independently and only related afterwards (Kinsbourne 1995, p215). 
On this model then, contrary to T1’s commitment to detailed, stable representations, there is a sense in which the spatial content of bodily experience is impoverished, as the body’s perceptible spatial layout is constantly decaying and updating (in this post hoc fashion).​[18]​ But this merely states that T1 is incompatible with the dynamic model. Remember our central question is this:
	When we notice the body is the content of our experience suitable for guiding actions? 
To gain any evaluative purchase from these illusion studies, we need to look at cases where actions are performed under the influence of a vibr0tactile illusion. 

2.4. Acting on (illusory) experience
It seems that T1 must predict that when a subject performs any action upon a body-part affected by a vibr0tactile illusion, that action will be directed at the illusory location, richly presented in the experience. By contrast, this is not a consequence of T2. The latter is not committed to saying that the content of the experience is suitable for guiding actions. Indeed, it holds that all the fine-grained spatial information required for motor control is excluded from the experiential content. Put another way: T2 leaves room for such information flowing exclusively beneath the phenomenal surface. 
Luckily Anthony Marcel (2003) has put subjects in just the right conditions to evaluate the two theses. He ran an experiment where subjects had the tendon of a visually occluded arm stimulated at the elbow joint, generating an illusory experience of arm position. At different points they were required to either “(a) report the felt position of the wrist of the stimulated arm by reference to a visual map of pericorporeal space, or (b) to grasp it with the other hand, or (c) to point to it with a pointer held in the free hand” (62-63) 
These were the findings:
(1)	Subjects point to the felt location
(2)	Subjects grasp the actual location
(3)	Subjects experience the grasp at the felt location 
	(after a few seconds)
(4)	Subjects do not notice the disparity between felt and grasped locations
It seems that T2 has just the right explanatory tools here. 
Firstly, by adopting Kinsbourne’s dynamic model of bodily awareness (3) can be explained by updating and post hoc relating (as above). 
But the real interest is the disparity between (1) and (2). 
This can be explained by distinguishing between actions performed on the basis of an expressive intention (pointing actions) from those performed with a more practical intention (grasping actions). On T2, these can be tied to the way the subject takes the object to be in different ways. Pointing is usually an abstract communicative act. When the subject points, the goal is not action upon the body per se, rather the goal is to report something as being a certain way, in a certain location etc. The goal is to express the content of an experience, which is in this case illusory (Kelly 2000, Marcel 2003). By contrast, the goal of a grasping action is to manipulate or engage, rather than communicate, the properties of a given location. The goal is to grip the object in a certain way and the corresponding experiential aspects are its affordances for gripping and grasping. Accordingly, subtle adjustments are made in apprehension of the object, but the low level details of these adjustments are uninfluenced by how the subject takes the object to be (Jeannerod 1997). So whilst the type of grip (power vs. precision) is determined by the experiential content, the implementation details involved in the actual performance and guidance of the action remain independent.​[19]​ 
Such a gloss follows naturally from T2, but seems strange on T1. For the main point suggested is that unless the purpose of the action is to express the content of our experience, then the content of our experience is not appropriate for guiding the action.​[20]​ The real difficulty is that T1 cannot distinguish between actions that are guided by experience and actions that are not, for in all cases it holds that the spatial content of the experience is fine-grained enough for guiding the action. If this were the case then both pointing and grasping actions would be directed at the felt location. But they were not. 
Of course the experimental setup is a special case: usually the way the subject takes the object to be is roughly correct; in which case experience seems reflected in action. But this is merely constant conjunction. Indeed (2) and (4) combined illustrate in a general sense how action upon and experience of the body can come apart, without a change in the phenomenology. 


2.4.1. An objection for T2 (a dilemma for T1)
Certainly, the above results are sufficiently problematic for (if not entirely incompatible with) T1 as it stands, to cast serious doubts about its explanatory adequacy. But one might raise an objection here.​[21]​ One might say that of course T1 does not have the right explanatory resources, as it been lumbered with the view that the experiential content is delivered in terms of this ‘universal’ framework. It seems plausible to presume that a proponent of T1 could still hold that the spatial content of our experience is suitable for guiding actions, and is delivered in a variety of task-specific spatial frameworks centred upon particular body parts. Then a proponent of T1 would seem to have some explanatory resources at hand. For the disparity between different actions performed could be explained by holding that the individual tasks require different spatial frameworks (e.g. one centred upon the arm in the grasping case, another centred upon the arm’s relation to torso in the pointing case). On this account, each spatial framework will have a corresponding experiential content. Some of these will be veridical and others non-veridical (depending on which framework is being manipulated in the illusion). Thus grasping actions would be guided a veridical content, whilst pointing actions would be guided by a non-veridical content. No wonder there was a disparity.
There is a straightforward response that can be pitched in defence of T2. The response is simply that whilst various contents may be sub-personally active, only the non-veridical content is experiential.​[22]​  But the more pressing point is that if the objection is made in the name of T1, it faces a further problem of giving an account of what is missing in the pathological cases. For at the very least it seems that the behavioural deficits of the peripherally deafferented subjects suggest the loss of just the kind of holistic motor processing scheme, namely the BS, that would employ a universal egocentric processing framework (§2.3). This is really a technical contention that the BS is in fact the kind of framework needed to guide actions. As a holistic motor processing scheme it supersedes individual frameworks centred on particular body parts, transforming them into universal co-ordinates in order to achieve overall sensorimotoric co-ordination in posture and movement. Denying this is really denying the existence and functional role of BS. I take this to be essentially an empirical matter and suggest that we hold the BS as a datum. The philosophical issue is over whether such a framework is conscious or non-conscious. Earlier we said it might be unfair to rule out the possibility of the BS being conscious (§2.3). Yet affirming that the BS is conscious merely sets up a dilemma for any proponent of T1. For if the BS is the framework in which the spatial content of the experience is delivered then the thesis has particular trouble in explaining why it is that actions are differentially affected by vibrotactile illusions, as it cannot appeal to the multiple spatial frameworks that our objector did.
In my view T1 cannot provide anything even close to an adequate explanation of the abnormalities in both cases. It seems fair to rule it out completely.

2.5 Another Cartesian response
But now it seems that we have given the Cartesian some room to manoeuvre. Indeed the foregoing seems to indicate that our phenomenological relationship with our bodies is not as intimate as it might seem. Just as we said earlier (§2.2): it might seem like we make direct phenomenological contact with the exact site of stimulation, but that seeming is probably the result of repeated success in our actions. And if we cannot credit this success to a detailed bodily experience then why, the Cartesian might ask, should we hold that the experiential content is intrinsically bodily? Furthermore, the attentional model employed above (§2.4) seems to suggest that body parts are primarily attended to individually and only after these initial drafts of selective attention is a spatial location determined on relative structural principles. This is prima facie compatible with an adapted Cartesian view on which only the primary draft is a clear and distinct perception and the post hoc spatiality is the result of a fallible post hoc judgement. Consistent with the rest of the Cartesian analysis, attention to the body is just attention to different parts of an object. So just as I might say that 
‘I seem to see this side of the cube’
…when I visually attend to a cube, I should say that
‘I seem to attend to this arm’
…as I proprioceptively attend to my left arm.
And indeed we seem to have solved the Cartesian’s problem on the output side by postulating a sub-personal motor-processing system that guides movement. So when I attend to an itch on my right hand, my experience informs me of a body part being in an itchy state. I select a type of action that will dispense with the irritation, and this action is guided by body-schematic processes that are strictly speaking properties of the body and not properties of the self. Only the un-located, clear and distinct, ‘primary’ attentional draft is an actual property of the experiencing self – which is wholly mental – providing information about body parts being in corresponding states. 
Thus we seem to have leapt out of the frying pan of the traditional Cartesian, only to find ourselves right in the fire of an adapted Cartesian account of bodily experience as intrinsically mental. This present account can be summarised as follows:
An Adapted Cartesian response
1.	Attending to parts of the body is akin to attending to a part of any object
2.	Attention to the body delivers information about a body part being in some corresponding state
3.	Attending to the body is necessary for experiencing the body
4.	The experience of body parts as spatially located is gained only by post hoc relating of primary attentional drafts
5.	Individual drafts of attention to un-located body parts are all that is clear and distinct in bodily experience
6.	Bodily experience is intrinsically mental
I will comment on two problems with this adapted account, each of which is considerably enlightening. 
The first is the presumption that there is a single/primary draft of attention to our bodies that makes it into our experience, prior to the determination of spatiality. This is in dubious faith with the attentional model. It is true that Kinsbourne (1995) indicates that attending to a body part is probably a two stage process, involving both an attentional shift and a resultant calibration between opponent processors that determines relative structural location (208). But it is unlikely that, even if it made sense to speak of any ‘primary’ draft of attention, that this would make it into experience before the reciprocal balance of opponent processors. Indeed this balancing act is crucial to the mechanics of Kinsbourne’s model, for it frames his attack upon other accounts that propose a veridical static neural representation of the body. To think that there is a primary, ‘clear and distinct’ experience of a body part that is prior to the determination of its relative structural location is to remove a crucial aspect. If the Cartesian wishes to embrace the model they would need to give up the notion of a clear and distinct (and intrinsically mental) draft. But then there seems little reason to maintain that the content of bodily experience is not intrinsically spatial. 
Secondly, and consequently, there are the interesting implications to the fact that we are fallible about the contents of our experience. The adapted Cartesian view sketched above, can only get off the ground by affirming a kind of error theory: our experience presents us with constantly erroneous contents e.g. in the experience of phenomenological contact with the exact site of a bodily stimulus. This is particularly difficult to reconcile with the foundationalist structure of the Cartesian theory of self-knowledge, for such a theory must rest upon self-justifying, infallible elements of our experience (§1.4). Indeed it seems that there are no such infallible elements in bodily experience. This falls out of two points of our discussion. Firstly, the content bodily experience is intrinsically spatial. Secondly, given its dynamic and unstable nature, the spatial content of bodily experience is intrinsically fallible. The problem is not of course that a subject would be in error in ascribing spatiality to the body tout court; rather the problem is that there is no primitive and infallible experience of exact spatiality. The experiential content always involves a judgement (or proto-judgement if you like) of the particular comportment of a body part or bodily location of a sensation – and this is not beyond doubt (§2.3)




3.0 Agency, awareness & the bodily self
Let me first remind of you of the account of bodily experience that I favour and its relation to the two claims we began with in the last section.
(i)	Bodily experience is intrinsically spatial, it provides the original location of the pain/itch etc. as within the egocentric space of the subject.
(ii)	The appropriate action for reaching a bodily location is determined by the content of our experience.
On T2, the intrinsically spatial features of my experience are the structural facts of my particular embodiment and concurrently the actions the body affords upon itself. Hence claim (i). 
When I try to act with or upon a particular bodily part, the action selected is constrained by my awareness of the broad structural layout of my body parts (viz. their joints and mobility) and thus an awareness of what sorts of actions are appropriate (and indeed possible). Hence claim (ii).
All of this is compatible with an ‘Action-Space’ account of the function of consciousness in action: to perform various coarse grained discriminations and initiate appropriate types of action concerning intentional targets, given that all the token details of actions are beyond (or beneath) awareness (See Clark 2001; Clark, Roberts and Ward in progress; see also Matthen 2005). More specifically, on the current account, the selection amongst various types of action is performed in the context of the subject’s actual physical makeup and the possibilities for action that it is directly perceived as affording.​[23]​ To take a crude example, I tend to be aware of whether or not I can (or indeed should) scratch the top of my head with my foot! But more generally the claim is that whenever a subject perceives a body part, or the location of a bodily sensation in a particular body part, the subject directly co-perceives his or her body as affording a finite range of possible actions.
This is not to say of course that each time we attend to our bodies we imaginatively run through a range of motor actions. Rather the point is a bodily analogue of a similar point made by J.J. Gibson (1966) about the ecological nature of visual perception, that aspects of the physical environment are directly perceived as affording certain actions for the perceiving subject. So when a bee perceives the surface of a petal, it is perceived as affording support, whereas for a baby it does not, it affords crushing or eating perhaps. Similarly more complex sensorimotoric performances are directly perceived by subjects with more complex sensorimotoric capacities. An able pianist perceives a piano as affording music, and perhaps, relative to her current purposes, as affording the particular piece Midnight Sonata, if she has the learned capacity to play it. 
Indeed Gibson seems to wish to generalise the notion of an affordance to perception in general, as part of an ecological account of perception (1966). Now there is some reason to think that merely possessing such an ecological capacity is insufficient for a subject to be a perceiver, where being a perceiver means instantiating a ‘point of view’ or conscious ‘perspective’.​[24]​ However, there are also strong reasons to think that it is a necessary feature of perception. In this regard Clark, Roberts and Ward (in progress) propose that being a perceiver is (constitutively) being poised above a space of possible actions. Whilst their account largely focuses on visual experience and makes this stronger claim, the similar account I have presented above makes weaker claims about specifically bodily experience and its action-orientated content. Nevertheless, given the clear parallels with the emerging Action-Space account of consciousness, it seems apt to schematically summarise the theoretical implications of T2 as an Action-Space theory of Bodily Awareness:
An Action-Space Theory of Bodily Awareness
	Fine-grained information delivered to sub-personal motor systems is not directly part of the content of bodily awareness
	These motor systems initiate a range of subtle commands, much of the detail of which is uninfluenced by the content of bodily awareness. 
	Bodily awareness plays a higher order role in selecting appropriate types of actions, based upon the subject’s awareness of the possibilities afforded by her own spatial structure and mobility.
There are two sets of concessionary comments to make before we continue with the final chapter. 
Firstly I must admit that I have only argued for a particular relationship between experience and action in the rather limited cases of bodily directed actions made on the basis of bodily experience. However converging evidence in cognitive neuropsychology and computational neuroscience indicate that a very similar account of the relationship between visual experience and visually guided action is the correct one (see Milner and Goodale 1995; see also Clark 2001 for a philosophically motivated review). This is certainly commensurable with the account given here.
Secondly, my account of bodily experience requires a caveat. For it might be objected by those interested in pre-reflective experience that the account that I have given is thoroughly incomplete. Indeed they might agree with what I have said about bodily experience, but would contend that it only applies to the observational level and that there is a non-observational level of bodily experience that is pre-reflective.​[25]​ I will make three short points in response. 
	Pre-reflective bodily experience pre-supposes the legitimacy of talk of a bodily self, as it is held to be a fundamental form of self-consciousness (Legrand 2006). 
	This notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness is a notoriously difficult notion to argue for or against (see Kriegel 2006, p4 (esp. note 11)); as such I shall not try to do either, given my current limitations. 
	I do agree that the action-space account sketched above only explicitly concerns ‘observational’ bodily experience. 
	But I do not agree that ‘non-observational’ experience is necessarily ‘pre-reflective’ experience, taking the latter to be experience of oneself as the subject (rather than an object) of experience. 
In view of this last point, I wish to admit that (in bodily experience at least) there is a peripheral awareness of one’s bodily nature, yielded (in normal subjects) by a ‘background buzz’ of somatosensory attention (see Kinsbourne 1995, pp217-218). This I would concede as a non-observational feature of bodily experience, taking observational awareness to be marked by cases in which one notices, and thus observes, or focuses on, one’s body proprioceptively. Clearly such observation is not exhaustive of normal bodily experience, for usually we only observe our bodies when they become conspicuous e.g. in cases of obtrusive bodily sensations, or in the failure of an action, or in training for a performance. Non-observational bodily experience is distinct and conceptually prior to these cases of noticing. It is rather the background against which such noticing occurs; the implicit bodily structure that underlies the feeling of being a whole body with certain boundaries. Now it may well be the case that such non-observational features are bound up (‘polyphonically’ as Andy Clark would say) with the content of observational bodily experience, but such a complex issue cannot be adequately addressed here. The issue that I will approach in the following is this: how is it possible to talk of knowing the body parts included in this peripheral sense of the body as parts of a bodily self? In this regard I propose to relate non-observational aspects of bodily experience to a long term sense of oneself as a physical agent: a practiced understanding of the actions afforded by one’s bodily structure and mobility, through persistent continuities in the experience of achieved movement (Gallagher and Marcel 2001; Marcel 2003). I also propose to articulate the dependence of the former upon the latter in bodily self-consciousness; one non-observationally experiences oneself as a bodily self only insofar as one experiences oneself (and has an implicit understanding of oneself) as a persisting physical agent. Aspects of the actual body will be included in the bodily self only insofar as they are included in the bounds of the self as such an agent. This, if correct, would provide independent justification for holding that reference to the body is reference to oneself. To begin to clarify these points, I will first outline some salient features of the sense of agency, particularly those concerned with the experience of actions as owned (§§3.1, 3.2). I will then relate these features to the experience of body parts as owned and the perceived boundaries of the bodily self as a physical agent, tying these comments in with the earlier discussion concerning bodily experience and the even earlier discussion concerning the possibility of bodily self-knowledge (§3.3). Finally, I will briefly suggest a relationship between occurrent and substantive bodily self-knowledge (§3.4), before concluding the thesis altogether.

3.1 Agency & Anarchy
To a first approximation we can say that the sense of agency is a conjunction of two experiential elements 
1.	the experience of an action 
&
2.	the experience of that action as owned
It is possible to distinguish the sense of agency from the sense of ownership (Gallagher 2007). As my legs move passively in an earthquake I still experience myself as moving. I own the movements, despite the fact that I have no agency in the movements. Nevertheless, it is only when one experiences an action as owned that one gets the sense of being an agent, or of an action being someone’s action.​[26]​ Indeed it is natural to think that one cannot experience a movement as an action and experience it as un-owned. Take a straightforward case of my body being physically manipulated by another person. Say I am a child, and an older, larger (less sensitive) child takes my wrist and starts hitting me in the face with my hand, all the while saying facetiously “Stop hitting yourself! Stop hitting yourself!” I am not hitting myself. But this is not to say that no-one is hitting me. He is hitting me, with my own body.
The point is that even if I am not the author of an action performed by my own body it is natural to think that there is always an author to any movement described as an action. In the example I did not experience myself as the author of the action and thus I did not own the action. But I still experienced the pattern of movement as an action performed by someone. It is tempting to explain this by tying the experience of action to the attribution of an intention; this would explain the tendency to think of actions as belonging to someone; someone who ‘had’ the relevant intention. Accordingly, without the right sort of link to an intending subject, a bodily movement is not experienced as an action, only a pattern of movement.
However natural such intuitions are, they are violated by the phenomenon of ‘Anarchic Hand’ syndrome (AH). In AH a subject experiences a movement performed by a part of his/her actual body (usually hands, but occasionally also feet) as both un-intended and un-owned.​[27]​ This would be trivial if the movements were merely passive movements or reflexes, for non-pathological subjects experience such phenomena all the time. AH patients do not experience the unintended movements as mere movements but as actions, simply because they have the characteristic purposefulness (and often complexity) of ‘goal-directedness’. This is clear when one looks at relevant cases: such as a subject who is buttoning a shirt with one hand and notices his other (anarchic) hand engaged in the unbuttoning of the very same shirt; or a subject who notices her hand reaching out to take food off another’s plate. Certainly these actions are controlled sub-personally. But there is a sense in which these actions are ‘out of control’. Metaphorically speaking, they have a ‘mind of their own’: the body part performing the actions does not necessarily conform to the subject’s intentions. It is thus apposite to call that body part ‘anarchic’. Indeed the point of interest is not merely that the subject does not consciously intend the relevant movements. Rather what is interesting is that no-one intends the movements i.e. the effected body part performs actions with no author and is experienced as an action without an author.​[28]​ 
So far there are (at least) three interesting lessons to be learnt from AH:
	AH provides an intelligible notion of action as ‘goal-directed movement’ 
	Experiencing something as an action does not require the attribution of an intention.
	In AH actions are experienced as un-owned.
One might be tempted here to make the inference that experience of an action as one’s own requires the self-attribution of a relevant intention. But one should resist this temptation also. We need not be aware of the relevant intention prior to or during the performance of an action in order to experience an action as owned. In fact a number of behavioural pathologies provide actual counterexamples – e.g. Tourette's syndrome and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, and certain forms of Schizophrenia. In these cases, actions are experienced as owned whereas the relevant intentions are disowned (Gallagher and Marcel 1999). And a similar situation can be induced in normal subjects. By applying Trans-cranial Magnetic Stimulation to the Central Thalamic Nucleus Hécaen et al (1949) (cited in Marcel 2003) were able to induce goal-directed hand movements in subjects. These subjects had no conscious intention to perform the actions. Indeed they were often at a loss as to why they performed the actions. Yet the actions they performed were not disowned. 
So, if conscious intentions are a non-starter, what is it then that explains why the action is experienced as un-owned in AH? Christopher Peacocke (2003) proposes that what is missing here is the phenomenal event of ‘trying’. A trying agent is not represented as separate from the action, requiring identification with the body that performs the action, rather the agent is represented as the physical ‘source’ of the action (Marcel 2003). As such tryings are sufficient for the experience of an action as one’s own (Peacocke 2003).​[29]​ It is important to note that – even understood in a fairly everyday sense – trying does not itself require a conscious intention. I can be trying to climb a tree and then realise that I have forgotten why I was doing so. This does not mean, of course, that there is no intention that would explain my action, or that intentions are entirely unrelated to tryings. Indeed tryings are usually the implementation of intentions. Perhaps I intended to prove that I could climb the tree and whilst immersed in the dangerous activity had forgotten why I was up there in the first place.​[30]​ 
These insights propose a fourth lesson to be learnt from AH:
	In AH the subject experiences an action as un-owned because the subject does not experience trying to perform the action. (Peacocke 2003)
I will further specify the nature of trying qua phenomenology of action in the next section.

3.2 What Trying Teaches
When actions are initiated (and usually performed) under the impression that the actual performance is possible we may say that subject tries or is trying to perform that action.​[31]​ The phenomenology of trying is the occurrent experience of initiating an action and sustaining that action.​[32]​ These need not be observational features of our experience. Rather they are manifest as a thin phenomenal awareness in the non-observational periphery of our experience of an action (Gallagher 2000). Some have called this an ‘occurrent sense of agency’ and have drawn attention to the ways in which it is tied to the ‘long-term sense of agency’ (Marcel 2003). I think this is right and will adopt such talk, turning to this relationship in a later section (§3.4). In this section I will garner a few insights on the phenomenology and mechanisms of this ‘occurrent sense of agency’. In the next section I will relate these (and previous) insights to the phenomenology of owning body parts and occurrent bodily self-knowledge.
As stated, the experience of trying to perform an action accords to ‘the experience of initiating an action’ and ‘the experience of sustaining an action’. Call these Ei and Es respectively, to denote the two types of experience. This may seem ambiguous. Is the experience of trying Ei, or Es, or both? The quick (and presently inadequate) answer is that the experience of trying is usually both. Clarifying this, requires a longer answer, involving both a look at some of the information processing structures thought to underlie the occurrent sense of agency and the application of these mechanisms to pathological experiences of agency. 
Much work in experimental psychology and the neurosciences suggests that our experiential access to our actions is grossly degraded (see e.g. Fourneret and Jeannerod 1998). Indeed, a number of elegant studies by Sarah Jane Blakemore and colleagues demonstrate that when we are the agents of our own movement, afferent sensory information is attenuated, which is why (amongst other things) we cannot tickle ourselves (Blakemore, Frith & Wolpert 1999, Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith 2000). This is implicated by a number of cognitive neuropsychological theories, which propose that a movement is judged as voluntary if and only if there is an overall coherence between afferent information and copies of efferent information, where the existence of the latter modulates the former. Sophisticated versions of such accounts employ the notion of a ‘comparator’ mechanism. A mechanism which receives a copy of the efferent motor signal sent to the relevant effectors in the implementation of a goal, as well as afferent sensory signals fed back from the various peripheral sensors that provide information on the ongoing movement. Each signal has a particular value, and on receipt of the efferent copy the comparator generates a predicted (expected) value for the afferent sensory signal. If the afferent signal has the same value as the expected signal, then the two signals cancel each other out and the origin of movement is attributed to the system, rather than an external source. However, if the two signals have different values then the movement is attributed to an external source rather than the system (Frith 1992). In sum, the presence of an efferent signal modulates the incoming signal. This modulation is both as matter of degree, on the basis of similarity to the prediction, and as a fixed attenuation due to the presence of the efferent signal that enables the prediction (Tsakiris and Haggard 2005). 
If such theories are correct, then the very presence of the efferent information modulates the information flow. Now, although the modulation of the information received allows the unambiguous determination of the source of the movement, this information itself is not infallible. Put another way, Es is not always veridical concerning the performance of an action. We can see this by expanding on how the structure described above enables Ei and Es respectively, and illustrating the expansion with pathological cases.
Ei is prior to Es, both phenomenologically and in terms of the information processing events that enable such phenomenology. Ei is not based upon actual feedback from the pattern of movement itself or even from the peripheral effort associated with the movement; rather it is enabled by the high-level efferent motor commands directly preceding action, the translation of goals into a pattern of movement.​[33]​ Es, however, is enabled as such by the comparison of multi-sensory feedback with a predicted value of that feedback, which (as above) is generated on the basis of an efferent signal (de Vignemont and Fourneret 2002). 
This allows for a fairly neat conceptual distinction between Ei and Es, and also (if our earlier analysis is correct) it suggests that Ei influences Es, as Ei is enabled by the efferent component. Exactly what this influence amounts to is a topic of ongoing research (see Tsakiris and Haggard 2005 for a review). However, I believe it is reasonable to say that in some cases a token Ei suffices to generate a corresponding token Es.​[34]​ Indeed this provides a fruitful analysis of case reports of clinical patients who are anosognosic for their hemiplegia (Feinberg 2001). These subjects do not know that for instance, their arm is paralysed, despite possessing intact peripheral somatosensors. Many of these patients, when asked to try and move their left arm will report that they have successfully moved it, unaware that they have not. The underlying malfunctions involved in these cases may indicate general malfunctions underlying confabulatory behaviour (Hirstein 2006). But that is a more general issue concerning the very nature of confabulatory belief. It does not preclude the phenomenological claim that those subjects who do report having performed an action have a token Es that is simply a non-veridical construction produced by the existence of a token Ei. One should not infer that this is exactly what is going on in non-pathological cases. But it does seem plausible to suggest that one is disposed to take a token Ei and a corresponding Es as reliable indicators of action, just as the pathological subjects are thus disposed. When I experience myself initiating an action, I have an implicit faith in my body to assert itself in accordance with whatever I am trying to do. This is a de facto assumption of reliability. I deem my token Ei and the corresponding Es as reliable indicators of my actual performance of the action that I am trying to perform, in that I assume my body to be capable of performing that action. And of course this is usually correct; given a properly functioning BS my body will assert itself with whatever I am trying to do; hence the assumption of reliability. But of course it is possible that my Es might be non-veridical, having been erroneously influenced by my Ei. I may have the occurrent experience of sustaining an action which I do not actually perform.​[35]​
Let me summarise before we move on: Ei dominates Es such that the latter is influenced by the presence of the former. An Ei and a corresponding Es are reliable, but potentially fallible indicators of actually performing an action. In a slogan: what trying teaches is de facto deemed reliable.

3.3. Continuity, ownership; the bodily self as physical agent
We considered anosognosic patients in the last section. Due to some underlying malfunction some anosognosic patients continue to experience themselves as sustaining actions performed by their arm, despite possessing impaired motor capacities and intact peripheral somatosensors. This (I proposed) might be explained as a case of an Ei extending its influence beyond the mere experience of initiation to produce non-veridical representations of the subjects’ arm actually moving i.e. a non-veridical Es. It is possible to prevent this from happening, with some interesting results. By caloric stimulation of the vestibular system and/or vibratory stimulation of the neck muscles, examiners were able to produce a temporary diminution of the pathology and patients were left only with their Ei. Interestingly, not only did subjects have experiential insight into the fact that they did not move, a number of patients disowned the limb that was unresponsive (despite the fact that they still experienced sensations in the limb) manifesting the behavioural symptoms of asomotagnosia (Bisiach et al. 1991; cited in Marcel 2003, and de Vignemont and Fourrer 2004). 
Coming back to the question of last section: Is the experience of trying Ei, or Es, or both? We can reiterate our short answer with a little more meaning. As we said, the experience of trying is usually both Ei and Es. This ‘usually’ is far from trivial. It indicates an inherent dimension of the occurrent sense of agency: a sense of continuity between token experiences of trying to perform actions; more specifically, a sense of continuity between token Ei(s) and corresponding Es(s). 
The importance of this dimension for the ownership of body parts is obvious in the cases of stimulated anosognosic patients, where the prevention of a corresponding Es causes an abrupt disruption. For this violation of their sense of agency causes the unresponsive body part to be disowned, despite intact peripheral somatosensors. But also this dimension provides interpretive measure to observations made on a peripherally deafferented patient by the famous neurologist Oliver Sacks (1986). Christina was once a sporty and athletic person, an accomplished physical agent with many sensorimotor capacities. However (like other peripherally deafferented patients) at the onset of her affliction ‘Christina’ was liable to lose track of her body parts and was unable to walk without highly concentrated conscious visual attention. With the loss of a properly functioning BS, came a dramatic loss of faith in her body to assert itself with whatever she was trying to do. For without a great deal of effort the actions that she experienced herself as initiating would not be sustained in anything like the way they would usually be expected to (1986 p50-52). She had lost the very continuity between token Ei(s) and Es(s) that is implicit and inherent in the occurrent sense of agency. At the onset of her pathology this disruption reportedly lead to “a deficiency in the egoistic sentiment of individuality”(52); Christina not only felt significantly “disembodied” but was in fact unable to identify with her former self prior to the disruption.​[36]​ Actually Sacks (1984) himself was party to a similar (albeit less extreme) disruption in recovery from a severe de-innervation of his leg. Despite the fact that he could feel the leg, he could not move it. It appears that in his case just the leg had been excluded from an otherwise functioning BS. But as he reports, phenomenologically it hadn’t just “been ‘misplaced’, it had in fact lost its place. For all intents and purposes what was once his leg had vanished, taking both its neural and experiential ‘place’ with it. The resulting experience, Sacks reports, was “a state of radical perplexity, a total breakdown in inner sense of identity…” (1984 p184-185) 
Having lost this dimension of continuity in her experience of trying to perform actions with her body, Christina had ceased to know herself as bodily. Similarly Sacks had ceased to know a part of his body as himself (displaying the onset of asomatagnosia). But this does not preclude such knowledge returning. I.W. and G.L were in a similar predicament at the onset of their pathology, but again felt a sense of ownership as they gradually functionally replaced their malfunctioning BS and were able to control their actions (Cole 1995, Cole & Paillard 1995). These subjects now have token Es(s) that correspond to their token Ei(s), despite the lack of proprioceptive feedback from their actions (Marcel 2003).​[37]​ Assuming that all the above is correct we can say that as I.W and G.L gained control over their bodies – as they once again became accomplished physical agents – they gained continuity in their experience of trying to perform actions with their bodies. Thus their bodies themselves were experienced as their own. 
So, just as the experience of trying is necessary for the experience of an action as owned (§3.1), continuity in the experience of trying to perform actions with a body part seems necessary for the experience of a body part as owned. This relationship between physical agency and ownership is paramount. As a physical agent I will only try and do what I believe is afforded by my bodily structure. The body parts that I experience as my own form the bodily structure that delimits my perceived boundaries as a physical agent. And the bodily structure that delimits my perceived boundaries as a physical agent is the bodily structure that delimits my boundaries as a bodily self. If a body part is disowned, the affordances of my bodily structure are altered accordingly; or rather, if it is not experienced as responsive to me as a physical agent, it is not a part of me as a bodily self. 
The key claim of the above is this: the physical agent is the bodily self. If correct this would provide independent grounds for claiming that reference to the body is reference to the self (§1.4). With such grounds in place, it follows that for any statement that self-ascribes physical properties on the basis of bodily experience (§1.3) – regardless of whether the experience is observational or non-observational – that statement is immune to error through misidentification relative to the first person pronoun. If the foregoing is in order, then such statements constitute occurrent knowledge of the bodily self. 
Of course this purported knowledge is fallible, as shown both in the account that I have given of observational bodily experience (§§2.4, 2.5, 2.6) and our brief discussion of the non-observational experience of one’s own actions (§3.2). Nevertheless, these sources of bodily self-knowledge are de facto assumed reliable. This assumption is made against a background of contextual knowledge. The ‘context’ spoken of here is the epistemic background of the bodily self. It is constituted by the implicit understanding that one is a persisting physical agent with certain capabilities embedded in an appropriate ecological context (Marcel 2003, Peacocke 2003). I will make a few programmatic points on this before concluding the thesis altogether.

3.4. The epistemic background of the bodily self
It is worth restating two points. In bodily experience I perceive myself as bodily and as affording a limited range of actions. I only try and perform actions that I believe I am afforded by my bodily structure. These are consistent with the more traditional view that no-one tries to do something that they do not sincerely believe is possible (O’Shaugnessy 1973, Peacocke 2003). But here I will suggest a slightly different emphasis on what might be essentially the same agenda: The actions that I select are constrained by my understanding of my bodily capabilities and limitations. In this regard it has been proposed that an agent is informed in its choice of action by what Gallagher and Marcel (1999) call its ‘Ecological self-awareness’: an ongoing sense of the spatiotemporal relationship between the physical agent itself, the environment, and the relative physical dispositions of both over time. This involves an ongoing “sense of capability” informed by an implicit “sense of what I have just been doing, and, of equal importance, what I can do, and what I am just prepared to do, a sense of capability which goes beyond the momentary” (1999 their emphases). Schematising their insights and combining them with earlier points, we can discern (at least) two dimensions of contextual knowledge grounded in ecological self-awareness, each possessing their own constraints:
(i)	The agent’s current purposes; constrained by 
a.	the actions the agent has just performed
b.	 the actions the agent intends to perform in the immediate future
c.	the estimated effect of actions on the local physical (and/or social) environment
(ii)	The agent’s range of afforded actions; constrained by
a.	perceived structure
b.	perceived mobility
c.	perceived efficacy relative to other objects 
This minimal list has two purposes. Firstly it illustrates the rough boundaries that various elements of ecological self-awareness provide for action selection. Secondly it illustrates the bridge that ecological self-awareness forms between occurrent bodily self-knowledge viz. bodily experience and tryings, and substantive bodily self-knowledge viz. the ‘long-term sense of agency’. This latter, the long-term sense of agency, amounts to a practical knowledge of one’s capabilities abstracted from the present situation, depending as much upon reliable effectiveness as ineffectiveness (Marcel 2003). It is likely enacted from birth in the ongoing engagements that the subject makes with the world as he/she learns to differentiate himself/herself (as an agent) from the world (as an environment) (Butterworth 1995). In the course of such engagements the agent builds up a dispositional store of sensorimotor knowledge that is rarely reflected upon by the agent itself, but is essential to the sense of continuity inherent in the occurrent sense of agency. According to some recent thinkers this sensorimotor knowledge shapes our experience of the world and is the basis of our perceptual contact with the world (Noë 2004, 2007). I am making the alternative claim however, that this knowledge shapes (but is not) our experience of ourselves as a physical agent, as instantiating certain bodily states, and as capable of certain actions. 





To give a final summary; I have argued the following: 
	Guaranteed reference to the body is insufficient to ensure reference to the self (§§1.2, 1.3)
	Descartes cannot give an adequate account of the relationship between bodily experience and action (§2.0).
	Bodily experience is intrinsically spatial and fallible; this is incompatible with Cartesian foundationalism (§§2.0, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6). 
	The intrinsic spatiality of observational bodily experience is delivered not in terms of a detailed passive experience that guides our actions, rather it is delivered in terms of the structural relationships between body parts defined by the possibilities that they afford for action (§§2.1, 2.3, 2.5, and 3.0). 

And I have suggested the following: 
	The experience of trying is a key component of the occurrent sense of agency, comprising the non-observational experience of initiating and sustaining (owned) actions (§§3.0, 3.1 and 3.2). 
	Continuity in the experience of trying to perform actions with the body delimits the boundaries of the self as physical agent and thus as a bodily self (§3.3.). 
	This provides independent grounds for claiming that reference to the body is self-reference and that bodily experience yields occurrent self-knowledge (§§1.2, 1.4, and 3.3). 
	Bodily experiences, and our experience of our actions, are fallible but de facto assumed reliable indicators of bodily states and the performance of actions (§§2.4, 2.5, 2.6 and 3.2).
	This assumption is made against a background of contextual knowledge, consisting of an understanding of the bodily self as a persisting physical agent with contingent limitations and capabilities embedded in an ecological context (§3.4).
	This understanding is partially constitutive of one’s substantive knowledge of one’s bodily self (§3.4).

Much of this dissertation (especially the later parts) should really serve as an initial sketch of what I intend to be a much fuller exploration into the nature and epistemology of the bodily self. This will require a much deeper analysis of the areas we have covered here, including the nature of the representations involved in various forms of bodily self-consciousness. It will also require a broader analysis covering ontogenetic, phylogenetic and interpersonal roots. As well as a more incisive analysis of whether there is a particular epistemological relationship between a subject and itself as a bodily self that might hold up to the charges pitted against reliabilism in general (see e.g. Bonjour 1998 for some of these charges). Finally, it will require a finessed synthesis of all these (and other un-named) elements.
Despite the fact that this dissertation has merely scratched the surface of a clearly vast (and profound) range of issues, I hope to have given the reader a basic sense of the line that I will take in navigating the theoretical landscape. If for some reason I have not, then I will at least say this: 
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^1	  In the light of the failures of this model, rather than concluding that the model itself is in error, Anscombe (1975) concludes that ‘I’ is not a referring expression. This is unnecessary (§1.1.2).
^2	  Russell first noted the regress (1917). It was first brought to my attention in reading Brewer’s (1995).
^3	  See also Evans (1982) p206.
^4	  See Perry (1979) for a similar example.	
^5	  The other ingredients to the antidote are actually much stronger, involving the relationship between objective thoughts and egocentric thoughts such as ‘here’-thoughts (see Evans (1982) Ch. 6 and pp222-224 of Ch. 7), and are related to an entire set of issues that I cannot spare room to discuss, concerning the putative elusiveness of the self (also known as the ‘no-subject’ thesis see Cassam (1997)).
^6	  My treatment here is strongly modelled on Brewer (1995) p296.
^7	  All talk of bodily experience in this chapter refers to ‘observational’ bodily experience (see §3.0).
^8	  I allude here to Descartes own definition of material bodies as extended. See his (1641) 2nd Meditation and his (1644) part 2, §4 
^9	  See §2.1 for more on this, and §3.0 for my final verdict on these ‘implications’.
^10	  This framework would be post-transformation from frameworks centred on individual body parts (see Pouget and Sejnowski (2001)).
^11	  The contrast here, concerning the functional relationship between consciousness and action, is certainly along the lines of that between “…experienced-based control’ and “…experienced-based selection’ (See Clark (2001)).
^12	  This is similar to the approach taken in Gallagher (2005) Ch 1.
^13	  In fact they are able to locate bodily sensations fairly well on a structural map of their bodies (see comments in Brewer (1995)). This might be due to a retained conceptual understanding of human body structure (Coslett et al.(2002))
^14	  This inference is an example of neuropsychological methodology of inferring the nature of sub-personal processes by abduction, in light of directly contrasting damage to the CNS and corresponding behavioural deficits (see Davies and Coltheart (2003)).
^15	  Also see references in Gallagher (2005) pp40-43.
^16	  More specifically, Kinsbourne (1995) hypothesises that awareness of the body is enabled by the reciprocal balance of activity in opposing cortical networks processing contra-lateral somatosensory input (p208).
^17	  This mode of information processing yields a set of bodily representations that are conceptually distinct from those that might be employed by the Body Schema (see Gallagher (1995), (2005)).
^18	  The BS is also constantly updating, but it processes information holistically (§2.2.).
^19	  See Jacob and Jeannerod (2003).
^20	  I am indebted to Julian Kiverstein for pressing me to make this point clearer.
^21	  Matt Nudds raises a similar objection.
^22	  I must thank Tom Roberts and Andy Clark for this initial response.
^23	  This perception may of course be illusory, or even confabulatory as in cases of anosognosia for hemiplegia.
^24	  See for instance Macpherson and Bermudez’s (1999) comments on sleepwalking. I must thank Fiona Macpherson for putting me onto this during a reading weekend at Nethy Bridge. See also Bermudez (1995) and Bermudez (1998).
^25	  Dorothee Legrand personal communication, also see her (2006) and (2007).
^26	  This is the case for both mental and physical actions (Gallagher (2005)), although our discussion will be restricted to the latter.
^27	  Importantly this experience is anomalous, the anarchic hand is not always anarchic; thus often actions performed with it are experienced as owned (Marcel 2003). This continuity may also explain why the subject experiences that body part as its own (§3.3).
^28	  This of course sets aside two alternative explanationsThe movements of AH patients are the actions of a concealed Frankfurtesque manipulatorThe movements of AH patients are the realisations of suppressed (unconscious) intentionsAlthough both are (broadly speaking) possible alternatives, I do not have the space to engage with either at present.
^29	  Note that this is not a necessary condition. As Wegner (2002) notes post hoc attributions of intentions may also be sufficient for the experience of an action as owned and here it is debatable whether there is an experience of trying.
^30	  See Searle (1983) on intention-in action, also see Marcel (2003) on unawareness of intention
^31	  Though of course a third personal description of an agent as trying to ф also assumes the possibility that they might fail to ф. See O’Shaughnessy 1978 
^32	  de Vignemont’s and Fourneret (2002) speak of both the ‘sense of initiation of an action’ and the ‘sense of one’s own movements’. This latter invites confusion between voluntary and involuntary movements, thus although I adopt talk of the ‘experience of inititiating an action’ I modify talk of the ‘sense of one’s movements’ to the ‘experience of sustaining an action’. I understand the latter to be the experience of performing an action until it is completed or interrupted e.g. by an obstruction or the initiation of another action.
^33	  This analysis is consistent with research conducted by Patrick Haggard and colleagues, where subjective reports of action initiation were correlated with contralateral activity in the motor cortex, associated with the selection of motor specifications, prior to the movements themselves (Haggard and Eimer (1999); Haggard and Magno (1999); Haggard (2003)).
^34	  It is debatable whether a token Ei is necessary for a token Es. Some might argue that AH patients have Es without Ei. I think (with Marcel (2003) and Peacocke (2003)) that what is missing phenomenologically in AH is the experience of being the ‘source’ of the action, and I take this to be Ei. So, one issue is whether this experience of source-hood is in fact Ei. And another is whether this can be divorced from the ongoing experience of sustaining the action. Again these are issues that cannot be adequately addressed at present.
^35	  See the second experiment in Marcel (2003) (p64-65) for a clear instance of this.
^36	  One might say that she was only able to identify with her former self through a process of identification, through descriptions such as ‘I was such and such a person then’ and ‘I am such and such a person now’ (§1.1.1).
^37	  Again this is consistent with the hypothesis that Es is heavily dominated by Ei (§3.2).
